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Yugoslav army is debatable. Another topic 
discussed in this part of the book con-
cerns patriotic and paramilitary organiza-
tions which consisted of veterans but also 
of members of the “war youth generation”. 
Newman discusses in detail the Organiza-
tion of Yugoslav Nationalists (ORJUNA) 
and its extremism and violence. He also 
writes about the Serbian Nationalist Youth 
(SRNAO) but fails to mention the Croatian 
National Youth (HANAO). He describes 
the conflict between ORJUNA and SR-
NAO seeking to point out its importance in 
the creation of the atmosphere of violence 
in Yugoslavia, but the reader cannot find a 
single word about the no less important 
conflict between ORJUNA and HANAO.
The third part of the book consists of 
two chapters and it addresses individuals 
and organizations mentioned in the first two 
parts now on the eve of and during the Sec-
ond World War. While reading the first two 
parts of this book, one may notice some im-
balance in the author’s approach to violence 
in interwar Yugoslavia and identification of 
those responsible for it. This last part of the 
book shows a marked lack of even-hand-
edness. Newman’s account of the Second 
World War on Yugoslav soil is a biased one. 
He discusses the Nedić state, the Chetniks 
and their leader Dragoljub Mihailović, the 
Ustashe, and the Partisans. The author tries 
to explain that the Chetniks tried to “main-
tain the culture of victory” and that “this 
course seemed like the logical continuation 
of the battles that had been fought by Ser-
bia during the years 1912–1918” (p. 250). 
Newman claims that “violence against non-
Serb, which was characteristic of the Chet-
niks’ fighting” (p. 251) had a political goal 
in sight – “an expanded and unified Serbia”. 
He insists on violence against non-Serbs 
while describing the Nedić state, and yet, 
while writing about the Independent State 
of Croatia (NDH) and the Ustasha regime, 
he fails to mention the Jasenovac concen-
tration camp or, for that matter, any other 
concentration camp formed on NDH soil. 
Newman observes that the Ustasha regime 
brought “a pleasing change of fortunes for 
many former Austro-Hungarian officers” (p. 
256). Even though he provides examples of 
former Austro-Hungarian officers joining 
the fascist Ustasha regime, he states that the 
Ustasha programme was far too radical for 
former officers of the Dual Monarchy and 
that the study of their role has had mixed 
results.
Tremendous amount of archival re-
search was done in preparation for writing 
this book. Newman researched his subject 
in the Archives of Yugoslavia, the Croatian 
State Archives, and the Archives of the 
Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. It 
should be noted, however, that the literature 
used lacks some relevant more recent titles. 
This book has its faults, but it offers an im-
portant study into veterans’ organizations 
and paramilitary violence during the inter-
war period.
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The Great War, with its aftermath, stands 
as the beginning of many narratives depict-
ing the history of the contemporary world. 
Looked at from the European perspective, it 
was, in the words of Ian Kershaw, the be-
ginning of the continent’s trip “To Hell and 
Back”. Charles de Gaulle’s claim that it was 
just the first episode of a second European 
Thirty Years’ War has found many followers. 
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The Great War marked the moment when 
industrialized societies unleashed, for the 
first time, all of their murderous potentials. 
As Tony Judt noted, it distorted employ-
ment, destroyed trade and devastated whole 
regions. Great enfranchisement in Europe 
which followed the war introduced social 
questions that would be crucial in political 
debates in the coming decades. Nineteenth-
century ideologies were remodelled and 
reshaped to respond to the concerns, fears 
and expectations of women and men of the 
twentieth century. But the war was not only 
European. Many empires collapsed, and 
all were shaken in their foundations. The 
chronically unstable Middle East is still in 
the conundrum of problems of 1918. As 
David Fromkin has lucidly noted, the peace 
that supposed to end all war, for the Mid-
dle East was the peace that ended all peace. 
New research stresses that even South 
America felt the impact of this global con-
flict strongly and clearly, and more than pre-
viously thought.1 
By 1991 there were more than 25,000 
articles and books written about the Great 
War, and the last quarter of the century 
saw a growing interest of historians.2 The 
Great War was without doubt a momentous 
event, which profoundly shaped the course 
of twentieth-century history. However, 
the question arises: what is there left to be 
told? In plain English, do we need another 
overview of the Great War and its conse-
quences? On the pages of his book, which 
is a demanding read in dense narrative form, 
Tooze attempts to convince his audience 
that the answer is yes. Therefore, he offers a 
sweeping revision of many widely held his-
toriographical conclusions. 
1 See S. Rinke, Latin America and the First 
World War (Cambridge 2017). 
2 J. W. Langdon, July 1914: The Long Debate 
1918–1990 (Oxford 1991), 51; J. Winter and A. 
Prost, The Great War in History: Debates and 
Controversies – 1914 to the Present (Cambridge 
2005), 16–17.
Tooze is an economic historian, whose 
previous work dealt with the history of the 
German economy.3 Bearing that in mind, it 
does not come as a surprise that economic 
arguments weigh strongly in his latest book. 
The book starts, rather unusually, not with 
1914, but with 1916, when it became obvi-
ous to all belligerents that the war had be-
come one of attrition, and when the relation-
ship between Wall Street and the Entente 
began to loom heavily over the outcome of 
the war. The book ends with the first eco-
nomic measures of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
administration. The centrality of economic 
argument is, perhaps, not surprising, for 
ever since Keynes’s Economic Consequences 
of the Peace historians of the period have 
been forced to deal with the financial aspect 
of the war’s outcome. Tooze argues that it 
was precisely in that period that the world 
order, and the way in which it was created 
and understood, underwent a complete and 
revolutionary reconstruction whose signifi-
cance has not yet been understood properly. 
If we would pick up the daunting task 
of summing up more than 500 pages in just 
one paragraph, it would go like this: the 
crucial figure and the crucial country in this 
“deluge” of world order are the United States 
and Woodrow Wilson. The end of the war 
and its immediate aftermath brought about 
a twofold change. First, power transition 
happened, with the US emerging so power-
ful that everyone else was forced to pivot on 
it. There was no regional or continental po-
litical aspiration that did not take this new 
reality into account. Second, a new kind of 
world order emerged. The nascent world 
order was unlike the previous, where the 
3 The Deluge is his third book. It is pre-
ceded by Statistics and the German State, 
1900–1945: The Making of Modern Eco-
nomic Knowledge published by Cambridge 
University Press in 2001, and the widely ac-
claimed Wages of Destruction: The Making 
and Breaking of the Nazi Economy published 
by Allen Lane in 2006.
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only power was hard power. In other words, 
Tooze argues that the power of Victorian 
Britain in its heyday cannot compare to the 
leverage the US had over its rivals during the 
closing stages of and after the Great War. 
Tooze writes that “this new asymmetrical 
financial geometry signalled the end to the 
great-power competition that had defined 
the age of imperialism” (p. 211). The US 
was so powerful that no historical compari-
son can be made. What was new in this era 
was the fact that unlike previous decades, or 
centuries, there could be no more separa-
tion between foreign and domestic politics. 
“Architects of the new ‘world organization’ 
were quite consciously playing the game of 
revolutionaries,” Tooze argues (p. 9). The 
new order, embodied in the rise of the US, 
was multifaceted; the importance of old-
style military power was still undiminished, 
but now it was interwoven with economic 
supremacy and a new economic model, on 
the one hand, and a kind of moral and po-
litical authority, on the other. Wilson is not 
portrayed as an idealistic preacher, whether 
that description be understood as apologetic 
or as critical. In his figure we can see a leader 
determined to establish a firm global lead-
ership of the US. A new age required new 
methods, and Wilson was determined not 
to draw the US into great-power relations 
where the rules were set by empires of the 
old world. Therefore, when discussing Wil-
son’s famous 14-point speech of 8th January 
1918, Tooze shows that what Wilson was 
actually doing with this speech was not just 
about presenting his ideological worldview. 
Tooze finds that the speech is vague, that 
it does not contain key terms associated 
with Wilsonian internationalism, and that 
crucial for understanding it is the fact that 
it was prepared as a reply to Lloyd George’s 
speech of 5th January, in which the British 
Prime Minister had tried to position Britain 
centrally in the alignment of the emerging 
world order. Wilson is remembered as an 
internationalist, but “the world he wanted 
to create was one in which the exceptional 
position of America at the head of world 
civilization would be inscribed on the grave-
stone of European power” (p. 54).
The foundation of Tooze’s argumen-
tation is unusual and yet persuasive: he 
combines a lot of advanced statistics and 
economic data with sources more often 
seen in histories of international relations: 
diplomatic dispatches, minutes of govern-
ment meetings, diaries and memoires. Even 
though material preconditions and economy 
provide the solid background of the narra-
tive, we can clearly see individuals and their 
own agency. His argumentation is not de-
terministic in any sense. When he speaks 
about the differences and conflicts between 
Clemenceau and Wilson, he explains them 
through different personal stories of the 
actors. A changing world acts as a stage of 
global politics, and this change provokes 
both Wilson and Clemenceau to try to 
adapt to it as well as they can. However, 
concepts of the future they envision hinge 
on their individual personalities, their edu-
cation, life experience and political beliefs.
Tooze argues that there are two main 
schools of interwar history, the “dark con-
tinent” school, and the “failure of liberal 
hegemony” school. He offers revision and 
seeks to find a synthesis of the two. Sailing 
through the main events of the period his 
book covers, from Verdun and the Somme, 
the October Revolution and the Versailles 
negotiations, and through the French occu-
pation of the Ruhr, the Locarno Treaty, the 
Kellog-Briand pact and the Great Depres-
sion, Tooze is not just enumerating events. 
Instead, he tries to demonstrate that the 
changes that took place can best be under-
stood if we assume that historical actors 
faced an unprecedented historical situation. 
That is why those who expect just another 
classical account of American isolationism 
will end up empty handed. Isolationism 
does not play an important role in Tooze’s 
interpretation. Positioning himself against 
the historiography which sees the period as 
the moment when British power yielded to 
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American, Tooze concludes that, “This was 
not a succession. This was a paradigm shift” 
(p. 15). When it comes to Tooze’s conten-
tion that the problems faced by decision-
makers were unprecedented, it should be 
noted that the argument is not completely 
new. Zara Steiner in her 2005 book The 
Lights that Failed: European International 
History 1919–1933, has clearly stressed the 
uniqueness of the 1920s in this sense.4
Tooze’s argument about the significance 
of a new relationship between foreign and 
domestic politics for global order can best be 
seen in the pages that deal with the question 
why the Entente survived the war. He claims 
that “Neither the military nor the economic 
effort would have mattered if the Entente 
Powers had not maintained their political 
coherence” (p. 173). Throughout the book 
Tooze demonstrates that decision-makers 
were aware of the new fact that actions in 
foreign policy cannot be separated from 
domestic affairs. We can see how German 
policy towards Russia from February 1917 
to March 1918 was always shadowed by the 
question of what would happen with Ger-
man political life. Inner German discussions 
before the Brest-Litovsk talks were not just 
about German policy in the East; they were 
even more about Germany’s own political 
future, since it became more and more obvi-
ous that it was not possible, despite the Ger-
man military victory in the East, to destroy 
the Tsarist regime and keep an autocratic re-
gime at home (p. 115). Along the same lines, 
we can see that the true motivation behind 
Wilson’s disarmament proposals was not his 
idealism, but his goal to avoid the Prussiani-
zation of America itself (p. 54).
It must be noted that Tooze’s view of the 
world order is a top-down perspective. It is 
not like Erez Manela’s Wilsonian Moment, 
where we can see the relevance of Wilson, 
and Wilsonianism, around the globe, and 
4 Z. Steiner, The Lights That Failed: European 
International History 1919–1933 (Oxford 
2005), esp. 602, 609, 630. 
where we can observe the world order also 
from the bottom of its hierarchy. Both his-
toriographical schools that Tooze attempts 
to synthetize are essentially focused on 
interwar Europe. Therefore, even though 
Tooze claims that the aim of the book is to 
trace the ways in which the world came to 
terms with the new central position of the 
US (p. 7), the core of the book is devoted to 
the parts of the world most relevant for the 
US, the westernmost parts of Eurasia and 
the Pacific.
A century ago Tomáš Masaryk argued 
that the Great War was a World Revolu-
tion. The Deluge, a meticulously researched, 
well-argued and stimulating book, clearly 
demonstrates that Masaryk was right, per-
haps even more than he knew. Tooze con-
vincingly shows that the change brought 
about by the war was not just about what 
was defined in the peace treaties, further-
more, the change in the world order, its rules 
and performance, was intangible and yet 
omnipresent. The book opens with a quo-
tation from Lloyd George’s 1915 Christmas 
speech, which deserves to be re-quoted. 
“The war, he warned them, was remaking 
the world. ‘It is the deluge, it is a convulsion 
of Nature… bringing unheard-of changes 
in the social and industrial fabric. It is a cy-
clone which is tearing up by the roots the 
ornamental plants of modern society... It is 
an earthquake which is upheaving the very 
rocks of European life. It is one of those 
seismic disturbances in which nations leap 
forward or fall backwards generations in a 
single bound’.” 
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